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PREFACE
Public Finance in Post-conflict
environments: A Policy Paper Series
In the wake of violent conflict, a key element of building
a durable peace is building a state with the ability to
collect and manage public resources. To implement
peace accords and to provide public services, the
government must be able to collect revenue, allocate
resources, and manage expenditure in a manner that is
regarded by its citizens as effective and equitable.
The tasks of revenue mobilization, budget allocation,
and expenditure management are bound together
by political imperatives as well as economic logic. To
collect revenues, the state must be seen as legitimate
in the eyes of its citizens. And to secure legitimacy, the
state must allocate resources and manage expenditure
effectively and equitably.
The need to build legitimate and capable states in wartorn societies is now widely recognized. The Principles
for Good International Engagement in Fragile States,
adopted by the development ministers of major donor
countries in March 2005, declares that statebuilding is
‘the central objective.’ This represents a striking break
from the prevailing wisdom in the closing decades of
the 20th century, when the state was widely regarded as
the problem. The state has been rediscovered: it is now
invoked as the solution.The policy rhetoric has changed
from downsizing states to building state capacity.
Yet little systematic work has been done on what
the international community can and should do to
strengthen the capacities of post-war states to mobilize,
allocate, and spend public resources.
This policy paper series, jointly published by the
Center on International Cooperation (CIC) at New York
University and the Political Economy Research Institute
(PERI) at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst,
seeks to redress this gap by presenting innovative
policy proposals targeting critical issues in postwar
public finance.
Building state capacities in public finance is crucial to
the success of peacebuilding efforts for three reasons:
»» First, governments must be able to ensure
sustainable funding for new democratic
institutions, for social programs that ease tensions
and redress grievances, and for public investments
to promote economic growth and development. In
the early post-war years, countries often receive a

large influx of external assistance that temporarily
can meet some of these needs. But aid typically
diminishes over time, so domestic resources
are necessary to sustain these institutions and
programs. A key challenge is to ensure that aid
does not ‘crowd out’ domestic fiscal capacities, but
instead stimulates their growth.
»» Second, fiscal capacities are needed to build a
legitimate state. Democratic elections do not, in
and of themselves, ensure state legitimacy. Neither
do ‘quick impact projects’ in which international
aid agencies seek to fill urgent needs. Legitimacy
comes in large part from government delivery of
services that people need and want. Elections
provide an avenue for the citizenry to voice
demands; responding to those demands requires
the capacity to mobilize, allocate, and spend public
resources effectively.
»» Third, in some cases there is a need to curtail extralegal taxation by ‘warlords’ and armed groups so as
to enhance security. In Afghanistan, for example,
control of border customs outposts is not only a
fiscal issue but also a security issue. Similarly, control
over revenues from natural-resource extraction,
such as logging in Cambodia or diamonds in West
Africa, is often crucial for establishing the state’s
monopoly not only in legitimate taxation but also
in legitimate force. At the same time, domestic fiscal
capacity is the only sustainable source of financing
for public security after external peacekeepers
have withdrawn.
The papers in this series offer policy proposals designed
to strengthen the fiscal dimension of statebuilding.
The authors draw on extensive personal experience
in public finance matters in war-torn societies, and
on lessons from comparative studies, including Peace
and the Public Purse: Economic Policies for Postwar
Statebuilding (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2007), the
outcome of the first stage of the CIC’s statebuilding
project. After a concise recapitulation of the problems
to be addressed, the authors concentrate on proposing
solutions that can be practically implemented.
We hope these policy papers will find a wide audience
amongst those who are grappling with the difficult
challenges of post-war reconstruction, and that the
proposals they put forward will assist in the twin tasks
of building legitimate and effective states and building
a durable peace.
James K. Boyce
Lead economist, Peacebuilding as Statebuilding Program
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RESOURCES FOR PEACE?
MANAGING REVENUES
FROM EXTRACTIVE
INDUSTRIES IN POSTCONFLICT ENVIRONMENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Revenues from extractive sectors play an important
role in many post-conflict environments. Oil and
gas, minerals, and logging often provide more
than 30% of state fiscal receipts.When managed
well, these revenues can help to finance postwar
reconstruction and other vital peace-related needs.
When mismanaged, however, resource revenues
can undermine both economic performance and
the quality of governance, thereby heightening
the risk of renewed violence. Managing revenues
from extractive industries is a crucial challenge for
peacebuilding. This paper offers seven proposals
that address this challenge.
1. MANDATE PEACEBUILDING MISSIONS
WITH RESPONSIBILITIES TO REGULATE
RESOURCE EXTRACTION.
In the transition phase, peacekeeping forces
should curtail access to resource revenues for
potential “peace spoilers.” During the peacebuilding phase, mission staff should seek to address
broader linkages between resource extraction and
conflict; where needed, this assistance should
include deployment of peacekeeping forces in
resource production areas and transportation hubs
to help control exploitation and address resourcerelated conflicts. In cases of UN trusteeship,
activities of peacebuilding missions include
the direct management of extractive sectors,
but transitional authorities, whether local or
international, should not grant long-term contracts
in extractive sectors.
2. RECOVER STOLEN RESOURCE REVENUES,
REAPPRAISE CONTRACTS, AND
NEGOTIATE NEW CONTRACTS.

Major losses of public revenue often result
from wartime looting and from the contractual
provisions entered into by previous governments.
Ex post facto policies are needed to recover stolen
funds, not only to augment fiscal revenues but also
to signal the end of impunity and discourage others
from such behavior. In the wake of violent conflict, a
systematic review of extractive sector activities and
contracts should be undertaken, with the concept
of “odious contracts” being applied to cancel past
contracts when this is warranted. Tax reappraisal
for activities conducted during the war should be
considered, and penalties levied on companies that
knowingly traded in conflict resources. Donors
should encourage such reappraisal by providing
technical assistance, by supporting civil society
organizations that play a monitoring role, and by
offering budgetary support to make up for potential
revenue losses during review periods.
3. MAXIMIZE DOMESTIC BENEFITS
FROM RESOURCE EXTRACTION.
Rather than rushing to involve foreign companies
in resource extraction, domestic entrepreneurship
should be developed to the fullest extent feasible.
Some resources can yield greater domestic benefit
if extracted through labor-intensive methods.
Domestic ownership can be public, private, or a
mix of the two. Effective regulatory mechanisms
in many ways are more central than the issue of
ownership. Measures needed to guard against crony
capitalism, asset stripping, and capital flight include
transparency in contracts and revenues, and the
establishment of firewalls between regulators and
the regulated.
4. DISBURSE RESOURCE REVENUES
DIRECTLY TO THE POPULATION.
Revenue-sharing agreements between governments
in a divided state, or between ruling parties in a
coalition government, have a poor record in terms
of risk of renewed conflict. As an alternative, direct
revenue allocation to the population should be
considered, particularly where poverty rates are
high and resource revenues are substantial enough
to make a real difference for the poor. Given the need
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for state revenues, one option is a hybrid scheme
whereby part of the revenue is distributed to the
population directly, and the other part is retained
by the government for public investment and
social expenditure. Another option is to transfer
all resource revenue to the population and then
tax the receipts according to the income levels of
the recipients. This would build tax administrative
capacity and at the same time help to close the
taxation-representation gap that afflicts many
resource-dependent regimes, encouraging citizens
to demand that the state justify its taxation and be
accountable to its people.
5. ESTABLISH RESOURCE-SPECIFIC
REVENUE INSTRUMENTS.
Three major types of fiscal instruments can be
created by domestic revenue management laws.
First, revenue volatility-smoothing instruments
should be promoted, with the support of donors
and extractive companies, to reduce sharp
variations in the level of revenues resulting from
up-and-downs in resource revenues deriving from
project cycles and resource prices. Second, savings
funds can be established to offset depletion of
non-renewable resources, but in light of immediate
postwar needs these usually should be limited to a
small amount of revenue whose management can
help build institutional capacity for longer-term
financial planning. Third, revenue management
laws can establish allocation mechanisms, such as
annual fund withdrawal ceilings and prescribed
ratios of revenue allocation across areas and
sectors.
6. SET UP A RESOURCE COMPACT VIA AN
EXTRACTIVE SECTOR FORUM AND ESTABLISH
AN INDEPENDENT MONITORING BODY.
The aim of a “resource compact” is to foster
constructive engagement among stakeholders
and improved regulatory capacities in terms of
legislation, implementation, and monitoring. Such
a compact can be forged by an extractive sector
forum that brings together citizens, politicians,
and companies in public debates. The forum
should inform the general population about the
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resource sectors; identify the nature, objectives,
and operational principles guiding the extractive
sector; and provide a public platform for extractive
sector stakeholders, thereby helping to fill the
post-conflict regulatory deficit. An independent
extractive sector monitoring body should be
established by the compact, to complement state
monitoring agency.
7. NEGOTIATE AN INTERNATIONAL
EXTRACTIVE SECTOR AGREEMENT
AND ESTABLISH AN INTERNATIONAL
REVENUE MANAGEMENT AGENCY.
Finally, an international extractive sector
agreement could reduce the economic and
political risks faced by populations in producing
countries. The agreement, drawing on relevant
existing international law and codes of conduct,
should define “conflict resources,” set clear norms
and reporting procedures regarding revenues
generated in conflict-affected countries, and
identify punitive measures for companies found to
be in violation of the agreement. The agreement
should set contractual benchmarks and facilitate
access to instruments that reduce revenue
volatility and better distribute risk between
companies and governments. An international
revenue management agency would help to
ensure that the “revenue pipeline” from companies
to governments and populations is tight, so that
revenues reach the population.
Post-conflict environments present exceptional
challenges and opportunities for improving. The
proposals advanced in this paper are not equally
applicable to all post-conflict cases. The specifics
of the setting – including the sectors involved, the
capacities of institutions, and the broader political
and economic dynamics of the post-conflict
recovery – will shape decisions on priorities from
the menu of policy options. These options can
do much to harness extractive resources to the
requirements of peacebuilding. Their pursuit will
require champions and appropriate incentives.

Public Finance in Post-Conflict / A Policy Paper Series /

RESOURCES FOR PEACE?
MANAGING REVENUES
FROM EXTRACTIVE
INDUSTRIES IN POSTCONFLICT ENVIRONMENTS
Philippe Le Billon1
Revenues from extractive sectors play an important
role in many post-conflict environments, where
petroleum, minerals, or timber frequently provide
more than 30 percent of state fiscal receipts (see
Figure 1).2 When managed well, resource revenues
can help to finance reconstruction and other peacerelated needs. When mismanaged, however, resource
revenues can undermine economic performance
and the quality of governance, thereby raising the
risk of renewed conflict and failing the hopes of
populations.3 Resource revenues need to be kept out
of the reach of peace spoilers and directed towards
statebuilding and economic recovery. And in divided
states, such as Sudan, disputes over resource revenue
control have to be resolved. Managing revenues from
extractive industries is thus crucial if peace is to be
sustained.
Figure 1 – Share of extractive sectors in government
revenue and GDP4

1 Philippe Le Billon is Associate Professor at the Liu Institute for Global Issues and
the Department of Geography of the University of British Columbia. He is the author
of Fuelling War: Natural Resources and Armed Conflict (IISS & Routledge, 2005).

This paper examines extractive sector challenges
in post-conflict contexts and offers several
proposals for resource revenues to consolidate
a transition to peace. The first set of proposals
relate to extraction management, including
peacebuilding mission mandates, the recovery of
looted wealth, post-conflict contract reappraisal,
and the promotion of domestic entrepreneurship
and employment. The second set refers to uses of
resource revenues, including direct disbursement
to the population and the creation of special
funds. The final set concerns resource governance,
including setting up a ”resource sectors compact”
that brings together government, companies and
civil society, and international agreements on
extractive industries.

CHALLENGES IN ”POST-CONFLICT” EXTRACTIVE
SECTOR MANAGEMENT
The post-conflict context is often unfavorable for
effective extractive sector revenue management
for several reasons. First, governments often suffer
from a lack of knowledge about the resources
available for exploitation and recent developments
in the sector – due, for example, to lapses in
surveys, undocumented
wartime
resource
exploitation, death or flight of qualified personnel,
and outdated training. As a result, governments fail
to maximize revenue collection, especially when
negotiating with better informed companies.5
Meanwhile, the population may have unreasonable
expectations of revenues flowing out of the
extractive sectors, and unsurprisingly attribute low
official revenues to high government corruption.
A major challenge is thus to rapidly acquire and
spread knowledge about potential resource
revenues, and to inform both policy decisions and
public opinions. As a general principle, resource
surveys, revenue flow analyses, tax structures, and
information dissemination should be supported by
international organizations assisting in the postconflict and reconstruction process.

2 One third of post-conflict countries since 1989 had fiscal dependence on
extractive sectors above 30 percent (excluding foreign grants and loans) in
the years following conflict termination. (Information culled from IMF country
reports and Peace Research Institute in Oslo conflict dataset).

Second, breaking the vicious cycle between high
risks and low fiscal returns represents a major

3 For discussion, see Michael Ross,“What do we know about natural resources
and civil wars?” Journal of Peace Research 41(3), 2004:337-356; and Philippe Le
Billon, Fuelling War: Natural Resources and Armed Conflicts, Adelphi Paper
373, (London: Routledge and IISS, 2005).

5 For example, recent progress in remote sensing (e.g. satellite imagery) or
better advice on tax avoidance mechanisms can grant an advantage to companies.

4 Data from IMF country reports and the Peace Research Institute in Oslo (PRIO).
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challenge. The risk of renewed conflict, degraded
infrastructures, and uncertainties in the regulatory
environment may disadvantage the government
in its negotiations with investors.6 Governments
often offer major tax incentives to attract largescale investments. Post-conflict conditions also
often attract the most risk-taking companies
that may be more inclined to use bribery, deploy
private armed protection, and take shortcuts in
terms of corporate social responsibility. Financial
institutions and donor governments eager to
fast-track foreign direct investment (FDI) may
turn a blind eye to the backgrounds and records
of these companies.7 As a general principle,
transitional authorities should not be granted the
right to award long-term contracts for extractive
projects. International assistance should provide
for budgetary and security support both to lower
risks and to help maximize fiscal returns.

Transitional authorities should
not award long-term contracts for
extractive projects, especially if
these include tax incentives.
Third, due to limited large-scale investment,
resources are often first exploited through smallscale ventures that offer livelihood opportunities
for local populations but often prove difficult
for the government to tax. This is often the
case, for example, with logging and the mining
of alluvial minerals. A major challenge in such
6 Hostilities and ‘high risk’ may be considered an advantage for some
companies. For example, the stock market responded negatively to the end of
hostilities in Angola, probably considering that diamonds companies would face
higher competition and stronger government bargaining power, see Massimo
Guidolin and Eliana La Ferrara,“Diamonds are forever, wars are not. Is conflict bad
for private firms?,” American Economic Review, 2008.
7 Risk insurance to resource projects may erode accountability and fiscally
hurt citizens in both exporting and importing countries. Many financial
institutions and credit agencies have sought to prevent such outcomes through
principles of conduct and selection criteria. See, for example, the World Bank
Group’s Extractive Industries Review, and the voluntary Equator Principles for
the banking sector (http://www.equator-principles.com/) that build on the
International Financial Corporation guidelines but remain voluntary and do
not address major incentives such as bank staff bonuses linked with approved
project financing. For discussion, see Andreas Missbach,“The Equator Principles:
Drawing the line for socially responsible banks? An interim review from an NGO
perspective,” Development 47(3), 2004:78-84. For a critique of the role of export
credit agencies, see Friends of the Earth and Pacific Environment, Extractive
Sector Projects Financed by Export Credit Agencies: The Need for Foreign
Investment Contract and Revenue Reform, 2005.

/2/

cases is to balance local livelihood opportunities
and fiscal revenue maximization. As a general
principle, a comprehensive assessment of options
for each sector and exploitation area should
clarify objectives, outline possible scenarios, and
help maximize broad developmental benefits.
Assessments and policies need to be based on the
participation of local entrepreneurs and workers
(including among the poorest), as well as free,
prior, and informed consent by local communities.
Finally, budgetary allocation in post-conflict
environments often presents special difficulties.
Incentives for corruption are often heightened
by the ephemeral character of political and
bureaucratic
appointments
in
transitional
governments. Political factors frequently intervene,
notably through arrangements for revenue sharing
between former belligerent parties. Corruption
may be tolerated by both politicians and donors
for the sake of “political stability.” Donor support
for social services can weaken pressure on the
government to allocate revenues to these high
priority areas. Some donors may tie their nominally
“unconditional” assistance to privileged access to
resource sectors, such as the granting of resource
projects to home companies or preferential
treatment in resource supply access.8 A major
challenge is thus to ensure that the path of revenue
allocation consolidates both economic recovery
and good governance. As a general principle,
revenue allocation mechanisms should foster a
sense of entitlement over revenues amongst the
population, building incentives and mechanisms
to protect revenues from abuses by governments
and extractive industries.9

PART 1: MANAGING EXTRACTION
The post-conflict transition is often characterized
by a rush to extract natural resources: local
populations need jobs, governments need revenue,
and companies want to access the most attractive
resource-extraction prospects. Undue haste is
especially characteristic when elites are driven by
8 See, for example, Luke A. Patey,“State rules: oil companies and armed conflict
in Sudan,” Third World Quarterly 28(5), 2007:997-1016.
9 For discussion, see Macartan Humphreys, Jeffrey D. Sachs and Joseph E. Stiglitz,
Escaping the Resource Curse, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007).
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short-term personal interests and when donors
actively promote FDI. Four main extractionmanagement challenges arise in such contexts:
regulating the post-conflict rush on resources;
recovering looted assets and dealing with the
legacy of “odious contracts” signed previously by
belligerents or transitional governments; striking a
balance between fiscal and other socioeconomic
objectives; and averting the foreign take-over of
resource sectors.
Regulating the “post-conflict rush”
Extractive businesses are among the most resilient
to armed conflicts. Often they are the last to depart
from conflict areas and the first to return after the
end of hostilities.10 Rapid recovery in the extractive
sector is thus often possible. Although restarting
an industrial mine may take years, many local
entrepreneurs and international “juniors” (midsize companies) handling small and medium-scale
projects can rapidly increase outputs, as attested
by diamond rushes in Angola in the mid-1990s and
Sierra Leone in the early-2000s. These activities
can help jump-start the economy, but their effect
on postwar statebuilding can be ambivalent. Tax
evasion, collusion with peace spoilers controlling
resource production areas, conflicts with local
communities, environmental degradation and labor
abuses are frequent and difficult to regulate. Not
only are these businesses subject to overlapping
and sometimes transient authorities, but they
also frequently deploy their own private security
forces.11 Policies and legislation are often in a
stage of reappraisal, while the ranks, capacity, and
authority of resource management institutions are
frequently depleted. The challenge is thus to fasttrack regulatory policies and institutions alongside
– and preferably ahead of – the post-conflict
10 In 1992, internal armed conflict was only ranked 20th among the investment
criteria considered by international mining companies for exploration and
mining; see James M. Otto,“Position of the Peruvian Taxation System as Compared
to Mining Taxation Systems in Other Nations,” 2002, available at http://www.mef.
gob.pe/INFECO/documentos/perufinalreport_280504Otto.pdf ; Jane Nelson, The
Business of Peace. The Private Sector as Partner in Conflict Prevention and
Resolution, (London: International Alert, Council on Economic Priorities, and the
Prince of Wales Business Leaders Forum, 2000).
11 See Damian Lilly and Philippe Le Billon, Regulating Business in Zones of
Conflict: A Synthesis of Strategies, (London: Overseas Development Institute,
2002); Madeleine Drohan, Making a Killing: How and Why Corporations Use
Armed Force to Do Business, (Toronto: Random House Canada, 2003).

rush. Regulations, however, need to be sensitive
to livelihood opportunities for local populations.
Priority should thus be placed on regulating
large scale extractive projects with long-term
consequences, while artisanal and small-scale
activities should be supported through legalization
and capacity building (see Proposal 3).

Proposal 1: MANDATE PEACEBUILDING
MISSIONS WITH RESPONSIBILITIES TO
REGULATE RESOURCE EXTRACTION.
Multidimensional
peacebuilding
missions,
including their peacekeeping forces, can be
mandated and deployed in resource production
areas and key transportation hubs to better control
resource exploitation and address resource-related
conflicts. Such a mandate can be backed by a
commodity sanction regime that is conditional
upon adherence both to peace process benchmarks
and legal practices in the resource sector.A logging
sector, for example, can be closed for exports until
sound regulatory institutions are in place, and until
the security and political situation can ensure that
these are effective on the ground.
Peacebuilding missions have often been hesitant
about such roles, viewing these as high-risk
burdens and distractions from their main mandate.
In Sierra Leone, the UN mission (UNAMSIL)
actively engaged in diamond-sector regulation
only in the last stages of its operation. Initially, it
was wary of infringing its mandate, antagonizing
local interest groups, exposing its troops to
criminal violence, and reinforcing rumors of
diamond deals by peacekeeping forces.12 Some
of these concerns were legitimate. Yet reports
from military observers about the importance
of diamond-related conflicts, including on-going
armed skirmishes, and assistance requests from
the government and from donors funding diamond
reforms led to its eventual engagement. From
2003 onwards, UNAMSIL conducted aerial surveys
and foot patrols, and targeted conflict-settlement
interventions in the diamond sector, often jointly
with the Ministry of Mines, but also occasionally in
a supervisory capacity.
12

Interviews with UNAMSIL officers, April 2001.
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UN peacebuilding missions have accumulated
much experience as transitional authorities and in
implementing sanction regimes: experience that
could be collected and analyzed to improve future
missions. In the transition phase, peacekeeping
forces should focus on curtailing access to resource
revenues for potential “peace spoilers.” This can
be done by identifying players in the extractive
industries, demilitarizing resource production
areas, and closing down activities benefiting
spoilers by targeting key trading intermediaries
and transportation bottlenecks such as bridges
and ports. Peacekeeping forces can also intervene
to prevent the escalation of resource-related
conflicts, as in the clashes between local youths
and demobilized rebel soldiers during the 2001
“diamond rush” in Koidu, Sierra Leone’s diamond
capital.
During the peacebuilding phase, mission staff
should seek to address broader linkages between
resource revenues and conflicts, by assisting local
authorities and international agencies in charge
of the resource sectors. Monitoring activities,
logistical support, and the “good offices” of the
UN Secretary General’s Special Representative can
all contribute in this regard. In the Democratic
Republic of Congo, for example, the UN mission
(MONUC) shares information collected on illegal
logging with several UN agencies, NGOs, and
government authorities.
In the case of UN trusteeship, activities include
the management of extractive sectors. Transitional
authorities, whether local or international, should
not be granted the right to award long-term
contracts in extractive sectors.13 But revenues
from resource sectors should be put under
international trusteeship, or at least supervision.14
Even as trusteeship is relaxed as domestic postconflict institutions consolidate themselves, it is
13 This principle is recognized in article 55 of the 1907 Hague Regulation
(occupying state as “administrators and usufructuary”), and was upheld by a
1976 US Department of Justice Memorandum, in the case of oil exploitation by
Israel in the Sinai (reprinted 16 ILM 753, 1977).This principle can be applied to
domestic transitional governments through local legislation, peace agreement, or
UN Security Council resolution.
14 See for example, Philippe Le Billon,“Getting it done,” in Ian Bannon and Paul
Collier, eds., Natural Resources and Armed Conflicts: Actions and Options,
(Washington, DC: World Bank, 2005), pp. 215-286.
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desirable to maintain external supervision and
a capacity to intervene in revenue management,
possibly for as long as a decade. Given sensitivities
over sovereignty, such efforts risk raising questions
about the motives of intervening parties unless
strict independence and an absence of vested
interests can be demonstrated. With regard to the
opening of oil fields, the Australian intervention in
East Timor and the American intervention in Iraq
offer cautionary examples.
Recovering looted assets and tackling odious
contracts
Major losses of public revenue can result from
wartime looting and contractual provisions
inherited from previous governments. International
aid can mask these losses, but they become more
apparent when donor fatigue sets in and countries
are most in need of sustained revenues.

PROPOSAL 2: RECOVER STOLEN RESOURCE
REVENUES, REAPPRAISE CONTRACTS, AND
NEGOTIATE NEW CONTRACTS.
Ex post facto policies are needed for the recovery
of “looted” resource wealth and the reappraisal
and renegotiation of contracts. Wealth recovery
seeks to identify and repatriate the proceeds
generated by illegal resource exploitation, as
defined by domestic legislation or international
sanction regimes. This can include the assets of
rebel groups and members of unconstitutional
governments, and the proceeds of companies
that participated in illegal commercial activities.
The objective is not only to recover money to
add to fiscal revenues, but also to signal the end
of impunity and discourage extractive companies
and banking institutions from participating in wartime resource looting.15
For contractual reappraisal, a first step is full
disclosure of contracts, corporate structure and
ownership. Confidential commercial clauses are
not to be considered legally valid, given that the
review is legally mandated for all contracts in the
country.Tax evasion and abusive practices including
15 For a presentation of challenges and options, see the joint Office on Drugs
and Crime (UNODC) and World Bank ‘Stolen Assets Recovery’ (StAR) initiative,
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/NEWS/Resources/Star-rep-full.pdf.
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tax holidays, transfer pricing, biased commoditypricing mechanisms, and liability sheltering need
to be revoked. This requires a systematic review of
extractive sector activities and contracts, including
those involving state companies, with a concept
of “odious contracts” being applied to cancel
existing contracts if necessary.16 Tax reappraisal
for company activities conducted during the war
should be considered, and penalties imposed
on companies that knowingly traded in conflict
resources (see below).

Abusive practices need to be revoked.
This requires a systematic review
of extractive sector activities and
contracts, with a concept of ‘odious
contracts’ being applied to cancel
existing contracts if necessary.
Donors should support such reappraisal through
technical assistance and support for civil society
organizations demanding and monitoring changes.
To gain the support of domestic authorities,
donors should consider providing budgetary
support to make up for potential losses in revenue
during review periods. In order for this process to
be meaningful, reviews must be open, with their
findings and contractual revisions made public. If
necessary, disciplinary measures against reluctant
companies and governments should be considered,
including through the targeted reactivation of
United Nations Security Council sanctions.
Tracking down assets requires extensive expertise,
judicial support, and collaboration from financial
institutions.17 The focus in such cases should
be on major investors, traders, and exporters.
Measures including judicial due process and the
disbandment of political militias should be in place
16 The concept of ‘odious contract’ is also applied to ‘odious debt’ contracted
by past governments against the interests of the people, without their consent,
and with the full awareness of the creditor. For discussion, see Ashfaq Khalfan,
Jeff King, and Bryan Thomas, Advancing the Odious Debt Doctrine, (Montreal:
Centre for International Sustainable Development Law, 2003); and Patricia AlvarezPlata and Tilman Brück,“Postwar Debts:Time for a New Approach,” in James K.
Boyce and Madalene O’Donnell, eds., Peace and the Public Purse: Economic
Policies for Postwar Statebuilding, (Boulder : Lynne Rienner. 2007).
17 See Jonathan M. Winer and Trifin J. Roule,“Follow the money:The finance
of illicit resource extraction,” in Ian Bannon and Paul Collier, eds., Natural
Resources and Armed Conflicts: Actions and Options, (Washington, DC: World
Bank, 2003), pp. 161-214. Among the rare cases of legal prosecution, in 2006 a
Dutch timber merchant, Gus van Kouwenhoven, was sentenced to eight years of
imprisonment for breaking the UN arms embargo on Liberia.

to prevent politicians exposed for malpractices
from “spoiling” the peace. Such policies may deter
future investments if contractual criteria are not
clear.Adoption of an international extractive sector
agreement (see below) would provide guidelines
for such contractual reappraisal.
Despite these constraints, there have been some
successes in contractual amendments. In the
Democratic Republic of Congo, a National Assembly
commission led by Christophe Lutundula identified
dozens of illegal or dubious contracts signed
between 1996 and 2003. Its December 2005 report
recommended the renegotiation or cancellation of
16 contracts, judicial investigation of 28 Congolese
or international companies, and prosecution for
fraud of 17 persons. The Congolese Parliament has
repeatedly delayed official consideration of this
report, with some senior politicians implicated
in these deals hoping to bury it.18 Yet following
repeated calls by civil society and opposition
politicians for contractual reviews, another
government commission concluded in late 2007
that out of 61 mining contracts reviewed – many
of them signed during the “transition” period – 38
contracts had to be renegotiated and 23 cancelled
because of irregularities.19
In Liberia, forestry concessions were cancelled,
and president Ellen Sirleaf-Johnson was able to
renegotiate an iron ore mining contract between
Mittal Steel and the previous transition government
that, among other abusive clauses, had allowed the
company to determine the price of iron ore and
thereby its own taxation rate. Public exposure
of inequities in the contract by Global Witness, an
international NGO with a strong track-record that
mobilized external technical expertise, as well as
Sirleaf-Johnson’s own background in banking and her
international profile as Africa’s first elected female
president, contributed to substantially improving
the new contractual terms (see Table 1).20
18 The Curse of Gold (Washington DC: Human Rights Watch, 2005); Lutundula
Commission Report, December 2005 available at http://www.freewebs.com/
congo-kinshasa..
19 J. Clayton,“Mining groups face Congo shake-up after review,”The Times,
November 8, 2007.
20 Global Witness, Heavy Mittal? A State within a State. The inequitable
Mineral Development Agreement between the Government of Liberia and
Mittal Steel Holdings NV, 2006.
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Table 1 - Fiscal aspects of Mittal contract
renegotiation in Liberia21
Initial Contract

Renegotiated Contract

Mittal sets iron ore price, and thus
effective royalty rate and tax rate

Iron price set by
international market price

Five year tax holiday, with
unlimited extension

No tax holiday

Obligations guaranteed
only by concessionaire
(Mittal’s subsidiary)

Obligations guaranteed
by parent company

Transfer to Mittal of main national
railway line and deep-sea port

No transfer, no
exclusive right

Extended and backdated
equitable treatment clause

Equitable treatment clause
limited to iron ore sector
and no backdating

Concessionaire rights to all
minerals in the concession area

Rights to iron ore only

Contract governed by
United Kingdom law

Contract governed
by Liberia law

Minimal social obligations

National senior
managers and health
care obligations

Revisiting liberalization policies
Extractive sectors have been liberalized since the
late 1980s, particularly in post-conflict countries.
Liberalization policies often increased foreign
investment and economic output, using reduced
taxation rates as a core incentive. The overall fiscal
impact has varied among countries, but observers
have pointed to long-term risks associated with
lower fiscal returns on non-renewable resources.22
Fiscal regimes have privileged income tax and
production sharing agreements (PSAs) that
grant the government a share of the resource
earnings, rather than royalties or publicly owned
companies.23 One problem is that the terms of the
21 Global Witness, Update on the Renegotiation of the Mineral Development
Agreement between Mittal Steel1 and the Government of Liberia.August 2007.
22 James M. Otto,“Global changes in mining laws, agreements and tax
systems,” Resources Policy 24(2), 1998: 79-86; Gavin Bridge,“Mapping the
bonanza: geographies of mining investment in an era of neoliberal reform,” The
Professional Geographer 56(3), 2004: 406-421.
23 In Azerbaijan, for example, oil and gas fields with weak future prospects
continued to be operated by the state oil company (SOCAR), whereas “new
fields are developed and managed under the leadership of international partners”
and their income is shared between government and companies according to a
pre-determined production sharing agreements, see IMF, “Azerbaijan Republic –
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resulting agreements reflect the limited bargaining
power of post-conflict states. A second problem
is that politicians often take decisions with longterm impacts based on short-term considerations.
They may be more eager, for example, to invite a
foreign company that is able to jump-start a project
and offer a large signature bonus than to develop
a domestic industry, ignoring the downsides of
locking the resource sector into foreign control
and exacerbating its “enclave” character.

PROPOSAL 3: MAXIMIZE DOMESTIC BENEFITS
FROM RESOURCE EXTRACTION, INCLUDING NOT
ONLY REVENUE BUT ALSO LOCAL EMPLOYMENT,
DOMESTIC ENTREPRENEURSHIP, AND NET
NATIONAL PRODUCT.
Attracting foreign companies to the extractive
resource sector is frequently the major priority
of the government and aid donors alike. Yet
domestic benefits may be better secured outside
of fast-tracked FDI projects. Some resources, such
as timber and surface deposits of high grade ore,
can be exploited through labor-intensive methods
requiring minimal technological and capital
inputs. These modes of exploitation (artisanal or
small-scale) may have lower tax potential, but they
often have higher net national value added than
capital intensive projects (see Table 2). Domestic
ownership provides more flexibility over rates of
taxation for sectors under domestic ownership
than those imposed by the “global norm” of foreign
investment.
Domestic ownership can be public or private, or
a mix of both. Private ownership can help to hold
the state accountable, but the state must also hold
the private sector accountable. Effective regulatory
mechanisms are, in important ways, more central
than the issue of public versus private ownership.24
In practice, governments have frequently sought to
bail out private companies – for example, through
Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix.” IMF Country Report No. 03/130, 2004.
Such a model was also promoted under a controversial draft oil law for Iraq. For a
critique, see Greg Muttit, Crude Designs - The Rip-off of Iraq’s Oil Wealth, (London:
Platform, 2005)
24 Erika Weinthal and Pauline Jones Luong,“Combating the resource curse: an
alternative solution to managing mineral wealth,” Perspectives on Politics 4(1),
2006: 35-53.
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tax exemption - when faced with the prospect of
large-scale unemployment or when key political
supporters are at risk. Measures are needed, in any
case, to prevent crony capitalism, asset stripping,
and capital flight. Among these are transparency
in contracts and revenues, and firewalls between
regulators and regulated.
Table 2 compares FDI-industrial and domesticartisanal (or small-scale) resource extraction.
Industrial exploitation generally provides higher
resource recovery rate than artisanal methods.
Yet higher imported inputs, expatriate wages,
depreciation, and profit repatriation reduce the net
national product (NNP) of industrial production
below that of domestic artisanal extraction. The
potential advantage of industrial exploitation is
higher tax revenue, but only assuming sound tax
policies. Attention should also be given to indirect
economic effects of both modes of production.
Domestic small-scale operations can generate
crucial financial capital for rural economies and
more local economic development.
Table 2 – Foreign-industrial versus domestic-artisanal
resource extraction25
FDI-industrial

Domestic-artisanal

Value of resource deposit

100

100

Resource recovery (gross output)

95

70

Material inputs
• Imported
• Locally produced

20
7

3
1

Gross Domestic Product

68

66

Wages and payments
• Expatriates
of which repatriated
• Nationals

7
3.5
14

0
50

Tax payments

20

4

Depreciation

9

1

Repatriated profits

18

11

Gross National Product

46.5

55

Net National Product

37.5

54

25 This table builds on the case of mining in Sierra Leone; see Tony Killick,“The
benefits of Foreign Direct Investment and its alternatives:An empirical exploration,”
Journal of Development Studies 9(3), 1973: 301-316. Some domestic-artisanal
profits are repatriated by exporters with transnational ties (e.g. diasporas or
domestic elites with family members abroad). See also D. F. Stewart,“Large-scale or
small scale mining: Meeting the needs of developing countries,” Natural Resource
Forum 13(1), 1989: 44-52. Repatriated profits in domestic artisanal correspond to
“capital flight”, notably from diaspora and dual-nationality exporters (such as Sierra
Leonean Lebanese).

PART 2: CHANNELING REVENUES
The uses of revenues from extractive sectors is
a major political and economic issue. Politically,
revenues can undermine a transition to democracy
and exacerbate identity politics. Economically,
revenues can retard economic diversification and
jeopardize sustainable economic recovery. Both
sorts of risk are particularly acute in low-income
divided states facing high levels of “horizontal”
inequalities between social groups with distinct
identities.26 Two key challenges in post-conflict
revenue management are therefore (1) how to
address resource-related identity politics, and
(2) how to ensure that revenues contribute to a
sustainable and diversified economy.
Resources and identity politics
A distinction can be made between resources and
resource revenues. The territory where resources
are located may be indivisible, whereas resource
revenues can be easily divided. The difference
was built into the peace agreement in South
Sudan, a compromise in which the ownership
of oil reserves was left outside the scope of the
agreement, until a referendum takes place, while
focusing instead on oil revenue sharing and
petroleum sector management. The problem is to
create a revenue sharing arrangement that is as
secure as a territorial division would be.27
With respect to resources, populations in producing
regions have claims related not only to ownership
but also to the socio-environmental impacts
associated with resource extraction. There is now
a substantial body of experience in addressing
these impacts.28 But experiences in post-conflict
countries remain relatively few and far between.
In Sierra Leone’s diamond sector, a scheme was
established to allocate some of the diamond export
26 See Frances Stewart, Graham Brown and Alex Cobham, Promoting Group
Justice: Fiscal Policies in Post-Conflict Countries, (New York: Center on
International Cooperation, and Amherst, MA: Political Economy Research Institute,
Policy Paper on Public Finance in Post-Conflict Environments, 2002).
27 See Jostein F.Tellnes,“The unexpected deal: Why the Government of Sudan
and the SPLM/A reached an agreement on oil issues through the IGAD peace
talks 2002-04,” Unpublished paper, (Centre for the Study of Civil War, Oslo: PRIO,
2005)
28 Béatrice Labonne,“The mining industry and the community: Joining forces
for sustainable social development,” Natural Resource Forum 23(4), 1999:
315-322.
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tax revenue to local communities. This promoted
the formalization of artisanal mining ventures,
helping to raise taxes while returning some of the
revenue to local communities.The scheme suffered
from several shortcomings, however: it was not
implemented for large industrial ventures, despite
the fact that these often had the largest socioenvironmental “footprint;” and many customary
chiefs who received much of the revenues were
not accountable to communities.29

Revenue sharing agreements between
governments in a divided state, or
between ruling parties in a coalition
government, have a poor record.
Experiences over the past two decades suggest that
revenue sharing agreements between governments
in a divided state, or between ruling parties
in a coalition government, have a poor record
in terms of risk of renewed conflict.30 Wealth
sharing may facilitate the positive conclusion of a
peace negotiation, but this does not guarantee a
positive outcome over the medium term. Indeed,
such agreements can have several negative
consequences:
• First, revenue sharing negotiated under false
pretences can enable belligerents to rearm. In
Sudan, for example, oil fields were developed
under the terms of the 1997 Khartoum Peace
Agreement, which granted several Southern
armed factions a share of oil revenues in
exchange for a cessation of hostilities. This
agreement eventually collapsed and conflict
in the region reignited, this time with a much
wealthier Sudanese government.
• Second, resource revenue allocation may be
perceived as rewarding the belligerent party,
providing incentives for other groups to follow
suit in a “copycat” effect. The Sudan Liberation
29 Global Witness,“Peacebuilding Omission?,” October 2007. Available
at http://www.globalwitness.org/data/files/pages/global_witness_pbc_
submission_101007.pdf.
30 Philippe Le Billon and Eric Nicholls,“Ending ‘Resource Wars’: Revenue
Sharing, Economic Sanction, or Military Intervention?,” International
Peacekeeping 14(5), 2007: 616-635; ongoing research at PRIO by Helga Malmin
Binningsbø and Siri Aas Rustad.
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Army in Darfur, for example, is perceived as
motivated in part by the example of the oilrevenue sharing deal negotiated with the
government by the Sudan People’s Liberation
Army in southern Sudan.31
• Third, sectarian divisions of resource revenues
risk aggravating tensions among communities.
In Nigeria, state-based revenue allocation
relying on identity politics undermined secular
modern governance through the reshaping
of incompatible community identities.32 In
Iraq, securing oil revenue allocation based on
population rather than on a territorial basis is
a preoccupation for Sunni Arab political parties
based in areas with little proven oil reserves,
and the regional autonomy promoted by oil-rich
Shiite and Kurdish political parties promotes
mistrust.33
Some central governments have sought to
address antagonistic identity politics through
fiscal decentralization, with mixed results.34
The process through which decentralization is
achieved seems to matter as much as its economic
outcomes. The best results, as in South Africa and
Mozambique, have been characterized by broad
popular participation (including by minority
groups), bargaining between government and subnational groups, state outreach in remote areas,
trust-building among groups participating in local
governance institutions, and revenue redistribution
across regions. Building on these experiences,
direct disbursement of revenues to the population
31 John Young,“Sudan: A flawed peace process leading to a flawed peace,”
Review of African Political Economy 32(103), 2005: 99-113.
32 Michael J. Watts,“Antinomies of community: Some thoughts on geography,
resources and empire,” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers,
29, 2004: 195-216.Yash Ghai,“Decentralization and the Accommodation of Ethnic
Diversity,” in C.Young (ed). Ethnic Diversity and Public Policy. A Comparative
Inquiry, (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 1998).
33 The clause of the 2005 Iraqi constitution guaranteeing a distribution of “oil
and gas revenues in a fair manner in proportion to the population distribution in
all parts of the country” only applies to currently developed fields. Revenues from
undeveloped fields were left under the control of regional authorities.
34 Arild Schou and Marit Haug,“Decentralisation in Conflict and Post-Conflict
Situations,”Working Paper 2005:139, (Blindern: Norwegian Institute for Urban
and Regional Research, 2005); Joseph Siegle and Patrick O’Mahony,“Assessing
the merits of decentralization as a conflict mitigation strategy,” Development
Alternatives Inc., 2007 available at http://www.dai.com/pdf/Decentralization_
as_a_Conflict_Mitigation_Strategy.pdf.
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can be proposed as a way to reframe the
institutional and economic relationships among
resources, governments, and the people.

PROPOSAL 4: DISBURSE RESOURCE REVENUES
DIRECTLY TO THE POPULATION
As an alternative to channeling resource revenues
through regional and local governments and the
parties that control them, direct disbursement
to the population offers several advantages.35
Direct revenue allocation provides tangible
evidence of a ‘peace dividend’ for the population.
Recent studies show that direct cash payments
contribute positively to poverty alleviation and
disaster recovery, including in conflict-affected
environments.36 Direct disbursement to the
population also sends a signal that resources are
owned by the people, not by the government
or the parties that control it. This can increase
pressure on companies and governments to
maximize public revenues. If the choice is made
to distribute the revenue equally across the entire
population, this can contribute to a sense of
national identity and common destiny. Last but not
least, direct disbursement is less subject than the
government budget to political manipulation and
associated grievances.

Direct disbursement to the population
sends a signal that resources are owned
by the people, not by the government
or the parties that control it.
Are direct revenue transfers unrealistic given low
state capacity, lack of information on citizens,
and rudimentary financial and fiscal systems in
many post-conflict countries? Direct payments
of oil revenues have been suggested in the case
of Iraq, only to be quickly dismissed due to
35 The Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend established in 1976 is among the
oldest scheme specifically aimed at direct disbursement (see http://www.apfc.
org/; Scott Goldsmith,“The Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend: An Experiment in
Wealth Distribution,” Paper presented at the Ninth Congress of Basic Income
European Network, Geneva, Switzerland, September 12-14, 2002 available at
http://www.iser.uaa.alaska.edu/Publications/BIEN--Permanent%20Fund%20
Dividend%20Paper.doc. See also Xavier Sala-i-Martin and Arvind Subramanian,
“Addressing the Natural Resource Curse: An Illustration from Nigeria,” NBER
Working Paper 9804 (Cambridge, MA, 2003).
36 Paul Harvey,“Cash-based Responses in Emergencies,” HPG Report 24
(London : Overseas Development Institute, February 2007).
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continued insecurity and weak bureaucracy.37 But
the situation in Iraq is not post-conflict. Logistical
challenges remain in many real post-conflict cases,
but they can be overcome. Moreover, tackling them
can provide benefits beyond putting money in the
hands of individual citizens. For example, the tasks
of peacebuilding missions often include voter
registration. This “political entitlement” process
could be matched with an economic entitlement
process, whereby a system of citizen identification
is set up. The basis for income tax collection can
also be strengthened, by providing an incentive to
enter into a formal financial relation with the state.
Direct disbursement can also help to build – or
rebuild – the financial sector.
Apart from implementation difficulties, direct
revenue transfers may pose other problems.
The transaction costs may make this option
uneconomic when per capita revenues are low. If
revenues are spent on non-productive imported
goods, this can be detrimental to the trade
balance and undermine local production. Political
manipulation can still occur, notably in the timing of
revenue disbursement.38 And direct disbursement
does not itself resolve the particularistic claims of
populations in production regions.
In the absence of adequate alternative sources of
revenue, direct disbursement may also reduce the
state’s ability to public goods and services. If direct
disbursement of revenues were used to justify and
legitimate privatization reforms of public services,
this could have a regressive impact on the poorest.
Given the need for state revenue, one option is
a hybrid scheme, whereby part of the revenue is
distributed to the population directly and the other
part goes to the government for public investment
and social expenditure.
An alternative way to address the need for state
revenue is to not only transfer revenues to the
population, but also to tax them according to the
37 Thomas Palley,“Oil and the case of Iraq,” Challenge 47(3), 2004: 94-112.
38 For example, direct disbursement was made in the 1950s by the government
of Alberta, Canada, just prior to an election. See Robert Bacon and Silvana Tordo,
“Experiences with Oil Funds: Institutional and Financial Aspects,” (Washington
DC: Energy Sector Management Assistance Program, World Bank, 2006).
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income levels of the recipients.39 This would have
a progressive income effect, leaving more revenue
in the hands of the poorest. At the same time, it
would inform citizens about both the revenues
generated by the extractive sector and the funding
requirements of the state. This system could help
close the taxation-representation gap that afflicts
many resource-dependent regimes, leading citizens
to demand that the state justify its taxation and be
accountable to the people.
Donor support for such a scheme could help
to advance the economic objective of poverty
reduction and the political objective of statebuilding. Donors could step in to compensate
for state revenue losses and thereby provide
an incentive for the government to support this
scheme. This budget support could be phasedin to respond to the absorptive capacity of the
government, and phased-out to incentivize the
state to develop its fiscal autonomy and foster
economic diversification.
Contributing to a sustainable and diversified
economy
Economic recovery is a priority and a moral
obligation in post-conflict contexts, given
years of violent dispossession, neglect and
curtailed opportunities. Moreover, peace can be
consolidated by tangible peace dividends, reduced
unemployment, and channeling efforts into
“business” rather than divisive politics. It would be
naïve, however, to think that economic recovery is
not political, or that it is inevitably conducive to
building a durable peace. Rather, attention needs
to be paid to the ways and means through which
recovery is achieved.
The channeling of resource revenues ideally should
foster a diversified and sustainable economy
that insures against future growth collapse and
39 See Martin Sandbu,“Natural Wealth Accounts: A proposal for alleviating the
natural resource curse,” World Development 34(7), 2006: 1153–1170. Income
levels may be difficult to determine and enforce. A possible option is to have
individuals self-identify as poor, middle, or rich, with their tax rate varying
accordingly. Self-identification could be posted on a public notice board at
the post office (or wherever dividend payments are disbursed), letting social
pressure/status concerns act as an enforcement mechanism for truthful selfidentification (James Boyce, pers. com, October 2007).
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thereby reduces the risk of a renewed outbreak of
hostilities. But extractive sectors present several
challenges to sustainability and diversification:
• First, extractive sectors often rely on nonrenewable
resources.
Investments
in
prospecting and more efficient technologies
can augment the status of reserves, but these
are ultimately finite. Dividend savings funds,
as in the case of Norway’s, may be part of the
solution to resource depletion. But in postconflict countries, reconstruction and social
needs militate against setting aside a substantial
fraction of resource revenues (see below).
• Second, extractive resources tend to create a
“resource trap” or “staple trap,” locking countries
into dependence and exposing them to future
revenue instability.40 Revenue windfalls resulting
from booming prices or one-time bonuses may
generate unsustainable expenditures and policy
“myopia,” delay reforms, and create unrealistic
expectations within the population. Revenue
collapses, on the other hand, may induce
governments to borrow beyond their means.
• Third, resource revenues face a high risk
of capture by ruling elites unless robust
institutions are in place to prevent this. There is
good evidence that extractive-sector revenues
are especially vulnerable to embezzlement,
and that resource wealth is correlated with
higher levels of perceived corruption in lowincome countries.41 There is also some evidence
40 See Richard M. Auty, Resource Abundance and Economic Development,
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). In principle, reinvesting revenues into
other sectors could assist diversification, but in practice, many countries fail to
efficiently manage this process due to misdirected resource revenue allocation
(e.g. through so-called ‘white elephants’ projects, protection of uncompetitive
‘infant-industry’, or corruption), constraints on labor skills, and trade barriers.
There are also incentives not to diversify the economy in order to curtail the risk
of political competition coming from independent sectors. Diversification is also
harder now that much of the manufacturing sector has already been “captured”
by the first and second generations of Newly Industrialized Countries, most
recently by China. For discussion of the latter constraint, see Raphael Kaplinsky,
Dorotha McCormick and Mike Morris, The Impact of China on Sub-Saharan
Africa. China Office, DFID, 2006; Ian Coxhead,“A New Resource Curse? Impacts
of China’s Boom on Comparative Advantage and Resource Dependence in
Southeast Asia,” World Development 35(7), 2007: 1099-1119; and Mauricio
Mesquita Moreira,“Fear of China: Is There a Future for Manufacturing in Latin
America?” World Development 35(3), 2007: 355-376.
41 Carlos Leite and Jens Weidmann, “Does Mother Nature Corrupt - Natural
Resources, Corruption, and Economic Growth,” IMF Working Papers 99/85, 1999.
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that levels of corruption increase in postconflict situations, possibly due to increased
opportunities coupled with competitive politics
and economic liberalization.42

PROPOSAL 5: IMPLEMENT RESOURCE-SPECIFIC
REVENUE INSTRUMENTS, INCLUDING REVENUE
VOLATILITY-SMOOTHING, SAVINGS FUND,
TARGETED ALLOCATION, AND MEASURES FOR
TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY.
Recent international efforts to address these
challenges have been devoted mostly to
transparency issues. Examples include the
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
(EITI), the Publish What You Pay campaign,
and the IMF’s Guide on Resource Revenue
Transparency (GRRT).43 International support for
revenue stabilization mechanisms, in contrast, has
faltered in the past two decades.44 Meanwhile,
with the exception of OPEC, most commodity
producer organizations have given up their price
stabilization activities.
Domestic “revenue management laws” generally
define the principles and objectives of resource
revenue management.Transparency, accountability,
representation and equity are major issues these
laws must address in order to avoid revenue
capture by narrow interest groups and to reduce
risks of (renewed) armed conflict. They can also
create three major types of fiscal instruments.
First, revenue volatility-smoothing instruments
seek to reduce sharp variations in the level
of revenues resulting from ups-and-downs in
resource production or resource prices. This can
be achieved through stabilization funds setting
aside revenues when these exceed forecasts or the
government’s absorption capacity, and by releasing
reserve funds when revenues decrease. Savings
funds serve a similar function, but with a longer
42 Philippe Le Billon “Corruption and the ‘liberal peace’: Peacebuilding and
post-conflict patterns of corruption,” International Peacekeeping, 15(2),
forthcoming 2008.
43 For information, see http://www.publishwhatyoupay.org/english/; and
http://www.eitransparency.org/.
44 Multilateral schemes to lessen commodity price shocks, such as the IMF’s
Compensatory and Contingency Financing Facility and the EU’s Flex mechanisms,
are limited in scope and hard to access.
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term horizon, seeking not to buffer variations but
to build a future source income, in particular when
the resource will be exhausted. Ironically, these
have generally been introduced where they are
least needed; that is, where sound fiscal policies are
already observed and resource revenues represent
only a small part of fiscal inflows.45 Stabilization
funds should be encouraged in post-conflict
contexts given the major volatilities in resources
revenues, provided that these are well integrated
into budgetary management and secured from
embezzlement. Savings funds, in contrast, are not a
priority given post-conflict economic recovery and
social needs. Establishing a savings fund can be
part, however, of a program of institution building.
But allocating significant amounts of money to it
in the early phase of the transition may be more
a source of tension than a contribution to state
consolidation.
Finally, revenue management laws can establish
allocation mechanisms, such as an annual
fund withdrawal ceiling and ratios of revenue
allocation to areas (such as provinces) and sectors
(such as health and education). Introducing
or consolidating such legislation and the
administrative and oversight bodies needed to
implement it should be a priority of post-conflict
state-building. One option is to put the proposed
legal framework to a referendum. Not only would
this grant stronger legitimacy but it would also
help mobilize and involve communities in debating
the draft. The absence of flexibility in budgetary
allocation, however, can be a source of tension, as
demonstrated in the case of Chad’s crisis over oil
revenues allocation.46

45 For discussion, see Richard M.Auty and Raymond F. Mikesell, Sustainable
Development in Mineral Economies, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998); Ugo Fasano,
“Review of the experience with oil stabilization and savings funds in selected
countries,” IMF Working Paper WP/00/112, (Washington D.C.: International
Monetary Fund, 2002); Humphreys et al., Escaping the Resource Curse, op cit.
46 While the Chad Cameroon Project was hailed as a ‘new model’ for oil
development in poor countries and benefited from unprecedented attention
and efforts, the project failed to ensure that strong institutions were in place
before oil revenues start flowing and the government faced bankruptcy in the
face of armed opposition. See Ian Gary and Nikki Reisch, Chad’s Oil: Miracle or
Mirage? Following the Money in Africa’s Newest Petro-State, Catholic Relief
Services and Bank Information Center, 2005.
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PART 3: STRENGTHENING RESOURCE
GOVERNANCE
Robust institutions can address some of the
deleterious economic and political impacts
of resource dependence and thereby help to
consolidate peace. Many of these institutions
directly relate to domestic statebuilding. The
state, however, does not operate in a vacuum. The
international institutional environment and the
behavior of multinational extractive companies
are central to post-conflict recovery. Two
proposals for strengthening resource governance
are presented below, both of which require the
support of international as well as domestic actors:
a national extractive-sector compact on resource
governance; and an international agreement on
extractive sectors, including an international
revenue management agency.

PROPOSAL 6: SET UP A RESOURCE COMPACT
VIA AN EXTRACTIVE SECTOR FORUM THAT
INCLUDES ALL STAKEHOLDERS, AND ESTABLISH
AN INDEPENDENT MONITORING BODY.
Incentives are a major driver of policy outcomes.
Because resource sectors and post-conflict contexts
are highly specific, finding the right balance of
incentives is less a matter of applying a blueprint
than of overcoming particularistic interests
opposed to the public interest. The public itself
needs to come forth, informed and supported by
civil society organizations, reformist politicians and
bureaucrats, aid donors, and progressive extractive
companies. One striking feature of post-conflict
resource reforms is the frequently confrontational
engagement of civil society organizations with
companies and authorities, and the criminalization
of extractive activities of local populations.47 In
the best cases, this leads to changes in the right
direction, but on many occasions the outcome
is greater secrecy and repression. Another
47 Cumbersome regulatory measures and ‘crackdowns’ on so-called illegal
logging or mining are common place in post-conflict countries, and can represent
a barrier to local livelihoods recovºery and bias favoring revenue concentration
by large corporations. See Neil Cooper,“Picking out the Pieces of the Liberal
Peaces: Representations of Conflict Economies and the Implications for Policy,”
Security Dialogue 36(4), 2005: 463-478; Heiko Nitzschke and Kaysie Studdard,
“The legacies of war economies: challenges and options for peacemaking and
peacebuilding,” International Peacekeeping 12(2), 2005: 222-239.
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common feature is an outdated, ineffective, or
corrupt regulatory environment. The resource
compact should thus allow for both constructive
engagement among stakeholders and improved
regulatory capacities in terms of legislation,
implementation, and monitoring.

The state does not operate in a
vacuum: the international institutional
environment and the behavior of
multinational extractive companies
are central to post-conflict recovery.
The heart of the compact is an extractive sector
forum that should bring together citizens,
politicians, and companies into public debates
that are reported by the media and considered
by relevant institutions such as parliamentary
commissions, relevant ministries, donor agencies,
and extractive companies.48 A main priority of
the forum is to identify and spell out the nature,
objectives, and operational principles guiding
the extractive sector.49 The forum should play an
active role in informing the general population
about the resource sectors, including the
potential value of reserves, forecasted revenue
streams, the possible modes of exploitation and
their socio-environmental impacts, in order to
foster accountability mechanisms. To this end,
the forum should have a secretariat capable of
acquiring, analyzing, and diffusing information.
A second priority of the forum is to provide a
public platform for extractive sector stakeholders,
notably for marginalized ones. Such platform
can facilitate representation and negotiations in
shaping sectoral policy and legislative affairs, and
contribute to filling the regulatory vacuum of postconflict transition.

48 See, for example, Business Principles for Sudan during the Interim Period
(www.ecosonline.org). In this case, the forum was a consortium of European
civil society organizations that spelled out the principles, activities, normative
framework, and benchmarks for oil companies to play a positive role in Sudan.
49 For an example of the limits and possible biases of participatory politics
and stakeholder consultation processes over oil revenue allocation, see M.
Humphreys, W.M. Masters, and M.E. Sandbu,“The role of leaders in democratic
deliberations. Results from a field experiment in São Tomé and Príncipe,” World
Politics, 58(4), 2006: 583-622.
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The resource compact should establish an
independent extractive sector monitoring body.
Arm’s length relations are key to credible monitoring,
and should be strengthened through financing
by a donor trust fund and diversity in monitoring
team membership. The monitoring body should
enjoy freedom of access to information and field
sites (including to company sites), and its findings
in turn should be reported to the public. Support
should also be provided for the complementary
state monitoring agency so that the state’s capacity
to perform its regulatory role is consolidated.

“natural resources whose systematic exploitation
and trade in a context of conflict contribute
to, benefit from, or result in the commission of
serious violations of human rights, violations
of international humanitarian law or violations
amounting to crimes under international law”.52
Resources suspected of meeting such criteria
should be subject to independent investigations,
such as those of UN expert panels, and the activities
and assets of companies involved in these sectors
made liable to international sanctions, fines, and
criminal procedures.

PROPOSAL 7: NEGOTIATE AN INTERNATIONAL
EXTRACTIVE SECTOR AGREEMENT AND
ESTABLISH AN INTERNATIONAL REVENUE
MANAGEMENT AGENCY.

Second, the agreement should set contractual
benchmarks, notably in terms of standards for
public bidding procedures, tax assessment (in
order to avoid transfer pricing and other tax
avoidance
mechanisms), and
transparency
and accountability in revenue collection and
allocation. The agreement also needs to address
resource revenue risk, notably by facilitating
access to revenue smoothing instruments and
by better sharing risk between companies and
governments.

Conflict situations have focused the attention
of the international community on resource
governance, opening political space for an
international agreement on extractive industries.50
An international task force including national
governments, relevant international organizations,
industry associations and civil society organizations
is needed to negotiate such an agreement, drawing
on relevant existing international law and codes of
conduct.51 National ratification of the agreement
could be backed by incentives, as well as by peer
and consumer pressure. This agreement would
have the potential to achieve the status of a
widespread mandatory norm.

The people of low-income
producing countries should not
bear more risks than large and
highly profitable companies.

50 See, for example, the proposal for an international charter for extractive
industries of Paul Collier, The Bottom Billion. Why the Poorest Countries are
Failing and What Can Be Done About It, (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2007). Collier’s proposal would establish voluntary norms, in contrast to an
international agreement that would acquire a mandatory status in international
law.

Third, an International Revenue Management
Agency should be created as part of the
agreement. The mandate of this agency would be
to ensure that the “revenue pipeline” between
companies, governments, and populations is
tight, and that revenues – whether in the form
of direct disbursement, public services, or both –
reach the population. In effect, the agency would
provide international insurance mechanisms,
in a manner analogous to the role that export
credit and receivables management agencies now
play in reducing investment and revenue risks
for extractive companies. There is considerable
expertise available for companies to recover lost
revenues following currency or political crises, yet

51 The joint task force could draw upon the experience of the Kimberley
process, the World Bank extractive industries review, the Canadian Government
roundtable on extractive industries, and the Mining, Minerals and Sustainable
Development project.

52 Global Witness, The Sinews of War: Eliminating the Trade in Conflict
Resources, 2007, available at http://www.globalwitness.org/pages/en/definition_
of_conflict_resources.html. See also, Le Billon,“Getting it done,” op cit.

Among its key elements, the agreement should
define “conflict resources” and set clear ethical
norms and reporting procedures regarding
revenues generated in conflict-affected countries
in order to deter activities that risk prolonging or
reigniting violent conflicts. One useful definition is
proposed by Global Witness: conflict resources are
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little of that expertise has been deployed on behalf
of the interests of local populations in producing
countries. The people of low-income producing
countries should not bear more risks than large
and highly profitable companies.
The agency could protect populations from
revenue volatility linked to unforeseen events,
currency devaluation, and resource price
variations, using revenue stabilization instruments
and direct budgetary assistance, to support and
complement the role of existing institutions (e.g.,
producers associations and international financial
institutions). The agency could also respond to tax
evasion and corruption, addressing complaints
by citizens and civil society with regard to fiscal
management. It could conduct budgetary audits to
assess the “spending” side of revenue management
and track down irregularities, which could then
be publicly reported and addressed through local
or international institutions. In exceptional cases,
government revenues could be directed towards
a trust held by the agency. Financing for the
agency could be secured through a consortium of
donors, companies, and producing governments.
Incentives for all parties would include greater
stability and greater legitimacy for the resource
sector activities.

CONCLUSIONS
Post-conflict environments present a promising
but challenging context for managing extractive
sector revenues. A central question is whether
revenues should be shared among governments
in a divided state and among parties in a coalition
government. The record of wealth sharing
agreements in the past two decades has been
poor. Wealth sharing may enable the positive
conclusion of a peace negotiation, but it does not
guarantee conflict settlement over the medium
term. Efforts to mainstream the management of
extractive sectors into conflict resolution and
peacebuilding initiatives should not only focus
on drafting agreements sensitive to extractive
sector issues, but also on providing the guarantees
that extend from rights over natural resources to
accountability mechanisms in revenue allocation.

Without such guarantees, wealth sharing is
insufficient, and in the wrong political context it
can even prove counterproductive. In addition,
the rights of transitional governments to allocate
long-term resource exploitation contracts should
be curtailed, and the resource revenues generated
under transitional governments should be under
external supervision.
A second question is whether extractive sectors
should be rapidly developed, even if at the
expense of domestic entrepreneurship and/or
fiscal revenues. Extractive industries can spur
economic recovery and contribute to political
stability, but a first requirement for these positive
impacts is for relevant institutions to be sufficiently
strong before exploitation occurs. Rather than
rushing to involve foreign companies, domestic
entrepreneurship should also be developed to
the fullest. Comprehensive options assessments
should be systematically conducted, and resource
exploitation should be the subject of prior and free
informed consent by local communities. To these
ends, an international agreement on extractive
sectors and the reappraisal of previous extractive
resource contracts are proposed.
A final issue is that of revenue allocation
mechanisms, including responses to the instability
and exhaustibility of resource revenues. Revenue
stabilization funds should be promoted with the
support of donors and extractive companies.
Savings funds, in contrast, are not a priority in poor
countries, and if introduced they should be limited
to a small amount of revenue whose management
can help build institutional capacity for long-term
financial planning. Direct payments or resource
revenues to the population should also be given
serious consideration, particularly where poverty
rates are high and resource revenues are sufficient
to make a difference for the poor. An international
agreement, including an international revenue
management agency, should seek to reduce the
economic and political risks faced by populations
in producing countries.
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The objectives and behavior of international
agencies play an important role in reforming
extractive resource sectors. Intergovernmental
organizations and donor agencies should provide
assistance to maximize revenue collection and to
ensure transparent, fair, and accountable allocation.
Revenue and socio-economic forecasting should
be provided and the results widely broadcasted
so as to build realistic expectations in the
government and among the population. Donors
should not systematically promote FDI-related
extractive policies and projects – at present a
central goal of their export and credit agencies –
over domestic entrepreneurship. Rather, donors
should support host authorities in allocating
resource reserves according to broader social and
environmental criteria, including the protection
and strengthening of local livelihoods. Given that
greater resource revenues eventually reduce donor
financial leverage, as the relative importance of
aid diminishes, extractive companies should enter
into agreement with donor agencies to ensure
the durability of reforms. An incentive to do so
could be provided by making such agreement a
condition of access to the services of export credit
agencies. An international extractive industries
agreement would help to curtail competitive
behavior among donors eager to promote their
resource interests, and provide a legal environment
guiding the behavior of extractive companies and
governments.
The options and proposals advanced in this paper
are not equally applicable to all cases of postconflict extractive resource management. The
specifics of the setting – the sectors involved, the
capacity of institutions, and broader political and
economic aspects of post-conflict recovery – will
play a major part in deciding which to pursue.
Just as importantly, the pursuit of these options
will require champions and the appropriate set of
incentives.
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